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This paper focuses on language politics as it is currently unfolding in Brazil.
Thanks to a legislative bid by a member of the House of Representatives to
curb the wide-spread use of English in the country, large segments of the
country’s population have suddenly become interested in language-related
issues. Professional linguists were taken by surprise and have, by and large,
been reduced to the status of mere spectators. In an attempt to address the
issue, I argue that there is an urgent need to attend to the wider public and
engage them in a fruitful dialogue.
Este trabalho tem como foco a política lingüística tal qual ela vem se processando
no Brasil. Graças a uma tentativa empenhada por um deputado no sentido
de coibir o uso descontrolado de inglês no país, grandes setores da população
têm mostrado interesse repetino em assuntos relativos à questão linguística.
Os lingüistas profissionais foram pegos de calças curtas e, de forma geral,
foram reduzidos à condição de meros espectadores. Ao tentar compreender
o desenrolar dos acontecimentos, argumento que há uma necesidade urgente
de atender aos anseios do público e dialogar com ele.
When it comes to talking about language, let alone theorising it, the
linguist and the lay person are notoriously known to diverge drastically
from each other. The former tends to dismiss the views of the latter as
“pre-scientific” and at best deserving of some vague anthropological
interest. In fact, as pointed out by a number of scholars and historians
of ideas, modern linguistics itself was founded on an outright rejection
of what it has since then systematically reviled as “folk linguistics”
(HUTTON, 1996; AITCHINSON, 2001; JOHNSON, 2001).
The lay person typically does not know (or, for that matter, does
not even care to know) what the linguist really does for a living and, when
pressed for a response, all too frequently comes up with such oft-repeated
platitudes as that the linguist is a polyglot or someone interested mostly
in dead or “outlandish” languages. “I am not half good a linguist as you
are, Holy Father” – these were the opening words used by President
Clinton as he welcomed Pope John Paul II on the Pontiff’s last visit to the
U.S. Whereas the President of the United States may arguably be excused
for not knowing what an academic speciality is really all about, one cannot
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but lament the fact that many dictionaries confer the stamp of authority
upon the common misconception just referred to. Thus the Webster’s
New Collegiate Dictionary (1976) registers two meanings for the word
linguist, the first of which says “a person accomplished in languages
esp: one who speaks several languages” (rather unhelpfully, the second
says: “one who specializes in linguistics”) (p. 669). MacMillan English
Dictionary for Advanced Learners (2002) follows suit by rephrasing the
two meanings as “someone who studies or speaks a lot of languages”
and “someone who teaches or studies linguistics” (p. 832). Both
dictionaries, though, do make up for the lack of clarity in the definitions
by defining linguistics in separate entries that say “the study of human
speech including the units, nature, structure, and modification of
language” (p. 669) and “the study of language and how it works” (p. 832),
respectively. Cambridge Dictionary (2002 – CD-Rom) does register a
reasonably accurate account of what a linguist specializes in but only
in the second part of the following two-part Boolean definition: “someone
who is learning a foreign language or can speak it very well, or someone
who has a specialist knowledge of the structure and development of
languages.” (Needless to point out that the first part of this definition gets
it even more hopelessly wrong than the entry in the other two dictionaries).
When the lay person is confronted with the sort of things linguists
routinely say about language (for instance, the claim that all human
languages are equally complex in their structural configurations, provided
one considers them in their totality), their reaction is usually one of
stultified incredulity, followed by a dismissive shrug of their shoulders,
indicative of their disapproval of the way specialised knowledge has
distanced itself from common sense views and developed its own
“convoluted” lines of reasoning (RAJAGOPALAN, 2002a).
In fact linguistics stands apart from probably every other
academically consolidated discipline in one respect: the kind of authority
that it commands with the public at large. Physicists and biologists have
no problem in getting the admiring attention from the lay public.
Members of the lay public fondly nurture stories about the eccentric
scientist – usually a chemist or a biologist – engrossed in research in a
crowded and dingy laboratory, teeming with gurgling test tubes, Kipp’s
apparatuses emitting strange-smelling gases and what have you. The fact
that no one outside a close-knit group of peers has the remotest clue
as to what the fellow is up to is considered no problem; rather, that is
just what really makes him so charming.
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Even radio and television weather-forecasters are listened to, albeit
with some distrust, since most people do know that meteorology is as
yet far from being an exact science. So too many newspaper and magazine
readers are often caught taking a sneak look at the kind of things the
astrologer has to say about what their zodiac signs have in store for
them, even though many of them may not have any faith whatsoever
in the scientific pretensions of astrology or may not be willing to admit
in public their real convictions on the matter.
When it comes to linguistics, however, the ordinary person is often
unwilling even to admit that he or she needs the help of a science to
become wiser about what language is and what it is not. Instead, the lay
person is often found boasting that he or she knows what language is all
about. The only uncertainties they have are about the correctness of specific
usages (for which they willingly turn to a traditional grammarian who
typically has a ready-made answer to each and every one of their queries).
On their part, professional linguists prefer to continue to ignore the
lay persons, justifying their reaction on the grounds that theirs is a science
and, like every other science, linguistics too is not for the uninitiated.
As one of the discipline’s most important representatives and, by all
means, the one responsible for bringing the name of the discipline to
the attention of wider public, put it,
[…] the search for theoretical understanding pursues its own paths,
leading to a completely different picture of the world, which neither
vindicates nor eliminates our ordinary ways of talking and thinking.
(CHOMSKY, 1995, p. 10).
Notice that Chomsky’s remark is very carefully worded. He is careful, as
the majority of linguists are not, to stop short of claiming that scientific
understanding is necessarily at loggerheads with public understanding.
The truth remains nevertheless that many linguists tacitly assume that
the knowledge that they have accumulated through painstaking
research over the years shows how hopelessly muddle-headed the
ordinary person is in respect of language and its intricacies. Whereof
the usual air of contempt vis-à-vis what is collectively dismissed as ‘folk
linguistics’ (RAJAGOPALAN, 2003a; forthcoming 1).
But, as experience has shown, linguists have had a heavy price to
pay and, by and large, continue to do so, for their principled decision not
to have any trucks with the lay persons. The ‘dogs-may-bark-but-the-
caravan-goes-on’ attitude assumed by many has often made them
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largely marginalized and inconsequential in public debates over language-
related issues. Historically, linguists have gone about their business in
utter disregard for public opinion. Yet, all too frequently, they are found
grumbling, like Achilles in his tent, that their authority is not recognised
the way it should be by the wider public. They lament the state of affairs
but seldom have any concrete suggestions towards addressing it. The
following words by Leonard Bloomfield in his inaugural address to the
Linguistic Society of America speak volumes for themselves:
Our schools are conducted by persons who, from professors of linguistic
science down to teachers of the classrooms, know nothing of the results
of the linguistic science, not even the relation of writing to speech or
standard language to dialect. In short, they do not know what language
is and yet must teach it, and in consequence waste years of every child’s
life and reach a poor result. (BLOOMFIELD, 1925, p.  2).
As Geoffrey Nunberg was to remark years later,
Bloomfield, Fries, Hall, and their contemporaries spoke to educators
with all the arrogance of an adolescent science that was jealous of its
intellectual prerogatives. As a result, their educational pronouncements
now sound as high-handed and in some cases as irresponsible as many
of the dogmas they were intended to counter. (NUNBERG, 1989, p. 586).
 Given the continued stand-off between the two, it comes as no
surprise that professional linguists all too frequently find themselves set
aside in policy decisions over linguistic matters. As it happens, the
policy makers in these cases are veteran politicians who tend to be
much more attentive to the vox populi than expert opinion. This has
been attested to time and time again in countries across the globe.
The present paper is an attempt to focus on the language issue
as it is currently unfolding in Brazil. Thanks to a legislative bid some years
ago by a member of the House of Representatives by name Aldo Rebelo
to curb the wide-spread use of English in the day-to-day life of average
citizens, large segments of the country’s population have suddenly
become interested in language-related issues. The bill has already passed
muster in the lower house and has just been returned by the upper house,
the Senate, in a completely unrecognisable form. The avowed aim of
the original bill and the one that was born out of its ashes is to protect
the country’s national language, Portuguese, against what it sees as the
merciless onslaught of English, by common consent the lingua franca
of the globalised world.
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The original version of the bill was full of rhetoric embellished
with fanfare and verbal pyrotechnics – of the kind that directly appeals
to popular sentiments of nationalism and what Fishman (1968) has
called ‘nationism’, i.e. the desire to legislatively intervene in the destiny
of a national language with a view to furthering certain nationalist
agendas. The country’s linguists, initially stunned and stupefied as well
as somewhat embarrassed at having been caught with their pants down,
soon regained their breath (and their wits) and almost unanimously
(there were some occasional discordant voices) condemned what they
rightly saw as a xenophobic attempt to stifle the natural development
of a language and mould its destiny with perilously chauvinistic objectives
in mind. Notable among the discordant voices just referred to is that
of Carlos Vogt, a linguist of considerable prestige, who wrapped up a paper
entiled “Português, língua universal ” (Portuguese, universal language):
Safeguarding […] the Portuguese language is safeguarding ourselves as
well as our rich cultural diversity. In this regard, the bill put forward by
Congressman Aldo Rebelo, under scrutiny in (Brazil’s) national congress
since 1999, could turn out to be an important legal instrument with
which to stregthen the conditions for our linguistic and cultural identity.
(VOGT, 2002, p. 29).
But Vogt’s remark is far from being representative of the stance taken by
the overwhelming majority of linguists in Brazil (or, for that matter, by
our colleagues in other countries, as and when they too find themselves
embroiled in public controversies involving language). The position
typically adopted by professional linguists all over the world is that the
phenomenon of language is best approached independently of social,
cultural or even emotional/sentimental connotations it might evoke in
the minds of ordinary people.
As a result of the hew and cry as well as tremendous pressure
brought to bear upon the legislators by academic associations such as
the Brazilian Association of Linguistics (ABRALIN), Brazilian Association
of Applied Linguistics (ALAB), and others, the Rebelo bill was drastically
altered by the Upper House of the Brazilian national congress and is
now awaiting presidential approval. Perhaps, one most important spin-
off from the imbroglio created by the entire episode is a sudden
awakening on the part of Brazil’s academic linguists. The following
remark by Faraco, one of the country’s leading linguists, is clearly
indicative of this new sense of awareness:
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Linguists are faced with the challenge of approaching these questions
as fundamentally political questions and think about ways of making
their voices heard, thus contributing to the beginning of an urgently
needed cultural war among contending discourses that address the
language of Brazil. (FARACO, 2001, p. 31).
As it happens, however, it is becoming increasingly clear that the
rigmarole is far from over. The popular resentment against the arrogant
march of English into their daily lives has gained fillip from unexpected
quarters precisely at the moment when it looked as if linguists had at long
last gained the upper hand. A self-styled group called “Brazilian Linguists
for Democracy” has suddenly sprung up and started to claim the right
to speak on behalf of the vox populi. In what is best described as a
vertable verbal Blitzkrieg, its advocates have forced their way into an
Internet discussion group called Comunidade Virtual de Linguagem,
which has been functioning for some time and which is used by
professional linguists, graduate students and – as the rules laid down
by its founding members state – anyone who has any interest in
linguistic matters (where the qualifier is loosely defined so as to
accommodate the maximum number of potential candidates to
membership). (Incidentally, the more vociferous members of this self-
styled “task force” have since been denied access to the chatroom on
charges of failure to comply with basic rules of decency).
The scenario as it is currently unfolding has the linguist once
again in the dock, being pinned down by accusing fingers and obliged
to respond to charges of social irrelevance and pointless erudition. If
the current trend continues to progress the way it has for some time,
Brazil’s professional linguists will in all likelihood soon find themselves
suddenly catapulted to square one (that is to say, if they haven’t been
so catapulted already), as in a game of “Snakes and Ladders”.
No matter what sort of ugly or catastrophical denouement awaits
the ongoing drama, one thing is increasingly becoming clear. The average
person in the street remains mostly impervious to the arguments of the
linguists which they find far too academic and often counter to their
own much-cherished ‘common sense’. What has gone awry here? Could
it be the case that linguists have revealed themselves to be hopelessly
wanting in basic skills of mass communication?
In an attempt to address these questions, I suggest that there is an
urgent need to rethink some of the basic principles that have governed
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our characteristic attitude (as linguists, that is) to public opinion. For
there to be a genuine dialogue between the two parties, linguists and lay
persons – or, for that matter, any two parties – there has to be some
amount of give-and-take on the part of either side (RAJAGOPALAN,
forthcoming-1, 2). Now, for reasons already spelled out earlier, this is
by all means easier said than done. Given that the science of language,
Linguistics, was itself founded on an inaugural decision to ignore the
ordinary person’s point of view and to start afresh on a “clean slate”,
no frank exchange of views between the two sides will be possible
unless and until linguists agree to give up or at least strategically suspend
one of the founding principles of their discipline. This is by no means
an easy task, especially in view of the fact linguistics itself probably
inherited the proverbial distrust of public opinion from a tradition
extending to earlier times. This is especially the case in Germany, the
one culture that saw the rise of interest in language in the eighteenth
century. As Hennigsen (1989) points out,
Hegel, who was interested in the unfolding of meaning in the process
of universal history, treated [the] Volkgeist (the people’s mentalité]
somewhat disparagingly by relegating it to lower levels of meaning that
lacked in conceptual clarity. Vox populi, the voice of the people, held
no promise for him of any truth of any aspect of the process of human
history. Truth would emerge from the negation of this commonsensical
type of knowledge. (HENNINGSEN, 1989, p. 46).
What Henningsen’s remark goes to show is that any decision to break
the ice and engage in a meaningful dialogue with the lay person is
bound to be an uphill task.
The first step in this direction is a most urgently needed realisation
on the part of the linguist that linguistics, like any other body of knowledge,
is invested with the marks of its own discursive origins. This is by no
means something peculiar to linguistics. All disciplines – tout court –
begin their march towards academic recognition as discourses. And
linguistics is no exception to this rule. It always begins with a group
of early enthusiasts who gather informally. Through their diligent
discursive practices aimed at carving out an intellectual territory for
themselves, they set about the task of laying down the basic ground
rules which will from then on delimit the emergent field and mark it
off from its neighbouring disciplines. Philosophy began like this in
ancient Greece around the figure of a bearded, bald-headed, short-
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statured man of exceptional intellectual acumen and power of
persuasion who regularly gathered a group of enthusiastic followers
in a marketplace, the Plaka, in the centre of the ancient city of Athens.
Centuries later, this practice was continued in Oxford where J.L. Austin
founded the school of Ordinary Language Philosophy during his
famous Saturday Morning Lectures.
The important point about informal chats resulting in the
founding of great academic disciplines is that dialogism is invariably
and inevitably present in the early discursive practices of every
discipline. It is not for nothing that the founding texts of Western
philosophy are called Dialogues. Plato, the author, knew full well the
rhetorical power of dialogic interaction. But one misses the whole point
if one concludes that the use of dialogue by Plato only served a
rhetorical purpose. The truth is that the new discipline that his works
inaugurated, namely Philosophy, would not have taken the form it did, if
it had not been for the Socratic method of elenchus that Plato so
effectively demonstrated in those early works. Elenchus works by
eliciting self-contradiction in one’s interlocutor’s thought. It is the
symbolic presence of the interlocutor that gives the technique of
elenchus its extraordinary appeal to readers by far removed from its
original enunciatory context.
Elenchus takes place within the dialogic format. Dialogue in turn
calls forth real-life communication in progress. And successful
communication in turn is only possible when the interlocutors not only
recognise each other’s presence but address themselves to each other’s
doubts, scepticisms, anxieties and so on. What this goes to prove is that,
in its inception at least philosophy was very much a pragmatic
enterprise (RAJAGOPALAN, 2002d). Not only was its early diffusion
carried out through face-to-face verbal interaction, the very structure
of its reasoning was dialogic through and through. It was verbal
fencing, where the one who could muster the right argumentative skills
won the duel.
True, all this was swept aside by philosophers of succeeding
generations who preferred to conduct the business of philosophy as
a mostly solitary business. Descartes famously retreated to his self-imposed
“solitary confinement” in appalling conditions in a single-room
accommodation at Ulm, where the only “luxury” (or sign of modern
civilisation) was the presence of a stove that would keep the inside
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temperature from dipping to sub-zero levels. Kant too was mostly a solitary
figure, with all the eccentricities that usually go with people who shun
the company of fellow humans. One might say that, in its modern
version, Philosophy has mostly been conducted as an occupation of
solitary meditation by hermit-like persons who preferred to communicate
to the world outside in the form of monologues, treatises and so on. The
popularly cherished image of the eccentric scientist – a chemist or a
biologist locked in an inhospitable laboratory for days on end as discussed
earlier – harks back to and is modelled on such prototypical figures.
But the appearance of monologue in many philosophical
discourses only helps camouflage their essentially dialogic origins. Like
Socrates and Plato, who were anxious to debate the views of the
Sophists, so too was Descartes concerned to lay to rest the rampant
scepticism of many of his contemporaries regarding the possibility of
ever attaining philosophical certainty. Likewise, Kant’s work, especially
of the so-called ‘critical’ period, has been widely recognised as engaging
in a silent dialogue between two unlikely predecessors, Descartes and
Hume, both of whom he greatly admired.
What has all this to do with the pragmatic underpinnings of
philosophy? The pragmatic dimension comes to the fore as soon as it
is recognised that philosophy is a discursive practice through and
through – even when philosophical texts succeed in concealing it. By
insisting on seeing philosophy as a body of knowledge more geometrico
(the model here is Euclid’s Geometry), one not only sidesteps its discursive
origins but also momentarily leaves in suspension its inalienably
pragmatic mode.
What is true of philosophy is true of linguistics as well. This is
hardly surprising, given that it is philosophy that most theoretically-
oriented disciplines have traditionally modelled themselves on. Like
philosophy, linguistics too was down to earth, and goal-oriented in its
origins. Some of the very ancient works of grammar such as Panini’s
trail-blazing Asthadhayi (? fourth century B.C.) were undertaken with
a keen interest in language maintenance and standardisation of the
Sanskrit language across the several kingdoms in the Asian sub-
continent where the language was spoken. It was a teaching grammar,
with a very precisely defined purpose, a fact that many linguists today tend
to overlook even as they recognise the scientific brilliance that went
into its making (RAJAGOPALAN, 2003b).
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What all this discussion about the dialogic character of academic
disciplines such as philosophy and linguistics clearly shows is that
concern with those who were not part of the in-group was paramount
in the minds of the early practitioners of each of them. Their respective
discourses were aimed at convincing – indeed, winning over the hearts
and minds of – the barely initiated as well as the stubbornly sceptical.
In fact, as Socrates recognised all too readily, that is the only way new
knowledge can spread. What Bacon called argumentum ad baculum
may work for some time (and for the wrong reason) but is unlikely to
sway the minds of people over a long period of time.
One thing that has clearly emerged from the ongoing controversy
over language in Brazil is that professional linguists have been dismally
wanting in the rhetorical skills needed to sway public opinion in their
favour. Instead, their opinions frequently strike the general public as
arrogant and standoffish. I have discussed some of these views at length
elsewhere (RAJAGOPALAN, 2002a) and will not repeat them here. But
the gist of the argument presented there is this: when confronted with
public opinion, we linguists have typically reacted by exclaiming that
such views lack any kind of scientific backing or rigour. We tend to
dismiss them outright as childish or unscientific. Rather than address
the anxieties of ordinary persons for what they are worth, we
characteristically question the academic or scientific credentials of those
who voice them. To put it differently, we tend to use ad hominem
arguments in order to fight our way through adverse public opinion.
The reaction from the public to such abrasive tactics is perfectly
predictable. To begin with, it is just as abrasive. As noted at the beginning
of this paper, members of the wider public usually have very little idea
of what modern linguistics is really all about. Professional linguists’
unwillingness to explain their science in a manner accessible to those
who are uninitiated in their “craft”, coupled with their often dismissive
attitude to what those who are uninitiated generally think or believe,
understandably leads the general public to conclude that linguistics
itself is a body of knowledge with very little practical consequence.
It is by no means enough if we continue to simply insist that
linguistics has a lot to contribute to the general welfare. No doubt
convictions do move mountains (as the saying teaches us), but this only
happens if we convince those around us of the kind of things we claim
we are ourselves convinced of.
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The lesson to learn from the discussion thus far is therefore fairly
straightforward: if we linguists are at all to make any headway in our
efforts to influence public opinion and bring the weight of our
accumulated wisdom to have any bearing whatsoever on policy
decisions involving language and so on, it is absolutely necessary that
we adopt new ways of communicating with lay people. Rather than
treat them as mere providers of raw data on which to base our studies,
we should approach them as our genuine interlocutors. Among other
things, this entails the need to put all the emphasis on the right strategies
of argumentation, taking into consideration the fact that our
interlocutors do have a right to their own opinions, no matter how
weird or bizarre they may appear to us at first glimpse (RAJAGOPALAN,
2002b). Furthermore, there is an equally urgent need to recognise that
true dialogue can only begin to take place if we are willing to listen to
what they, our interlocutors, have to say, instead of dismissing their
views as pre-scientific or muddle-headed even before they have had
a chance to express themselves freely .
Here is where some of the lessons from pragmatics might prove
to be of great help. Pragmatists are in a much better position to break
the communicational gridlock referred to above, given that, when all
is said and done, pragmatics is precisely about communicating with
others. If, from a historical point of view, linguistic pragmatics has been,
rightly or wrongly, entrusted with the task of taking care of unsolved
(and unsolveable) problems left over by the other putatively “nobler”
members of the Peircean triad (namely, syntax and semantics), it may
well turn out to be case that the greatest challenge awaiting it today is
to bridge the biggest of all the communicational gaps it has thus far been
called upon to confront – that between the linguists and the lay persons.
In other words, pragmatics may turn out to be our last hope for clearing
up long-standing mutual suspicions vis-à-vis the public at large – or,
at the very least, making a rapprochement possible somewhere down
the road (RAJAGOPALAN, 2002c, d).
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